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1.0 Background 
Staff and students at Lancaster University have, for the 
past five years, been involved in the development of an 
autonomous robot excavator - LUCIE - the Lancaster 
University Computerised Intelligent Excavator. An 
excavator provides a good opportunity for development, 
as it is basically a highly efficient and well developed 
four degree-of-freedom manipulator arm, but with the 
complete absence of automation or intelligence. The aim 
of the project is to add autonomy in order to produce a 
robot excavator with the following characteristics: 
0 It should concentrate on the task of trenching, and 
be able to produce a good quality and accurate 
smooth-bottomed trench. 
It should adapt to different soil types without 
human intervention. 
0 It should cope with obstructions, such as boulders 
in the trench. 
0 It should eventually be a self-contained system with 
no cables to external computers. 
Figure 1 - Fifth scale hydraulic model 
The first stage of the work was sponsored by the U.K. 
Engineering and Physical Sciences research Council 
(EPSRC) and involved site studies of the excavation 
process [Green 19901. The techniques and strategies of 
skilled drivers were observed and analysed. A working 
hydraulic fifth-scale model was constructed - see figure 
1 - and this enabled automated digging strategies to be 
developed in the laboratory. 
A full-sized rapid prototype was then produced using 
largely off-the-shelf components The purpose of the 
prototype was to prove the concept and to further refme 
the system requirements. A hardware platform was 
provided by the JCB excavator company in the form of 
a JCB 801 tracked mini-excavator - see figure 2. An 
identical system architecture to the fifth-scale model 
was adopted which enabled software to be transferred 
easily from one to the other. The main processor used 
was a Harris RTX2000 communicating via a standard 
industrial STE (IEEE 1000) bus. This processor is a 
high speed device optimised for the FORTH computer 
language. For more details see [Bracewell 19901 & 
[Seward 19921. Although the rapid prototype met the 
initial aims of the project listed above, the solution 
lacked compactness, robustness and was reasonably 
expensive in hardware terms. Neither was the rapid 
prototype mobile - i.e. the arm was under computer 
control but no attempt was made to control the tracks. 
Figure 2 - The JCB 801 mini-excavator 
Having shown that the initial aims are realistic it was 
decided to re-engineer LUCIE in a more robust and 
professional manner - the next stage being referred to as 
a development prototype. The hardware is described in 
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section 3.0. It was also decided to make LUCIE mobile 
by extending automation to the tracks. This immediately 
emphasises the problems of safety with such large and 
powerful mobile robots. It is the approach to these 
safety problems that forms the bulk of the remainder of 
this paper. 
2.0 Basic software architecture 
One of the most important outcomes of the rapid 
prototype was the effective high level decomposition of 
the system into discrete modules. A useful guide to 
minimising coupling between modules is to consider the 
points where a human would intervene in the system in 
the event of a failure. This is shown in figure 3. The 
safety manager is not shown connected at this stage as it 
has a unique status. This is discussed in more detail 
later. 
~ 
{ Navigationmanager \\ 
Figure 3 .. Top-level decomposition with points of 
human intervention 
Two of the above modules, the low-level arm controller 
and the digging manager will be considered in more 
detail. 
The purpose of the low-level arm controller is to take 
movement commands from the digging manager and 
send the appropriate control signals to the electro- 
hydraulic valves. Experiments with the fifth-scale model 
revealed the desirability of a dual control strategy which 
is closely reflected in the human approach to digging. 
When moving in air (i.e. tipping the spoil and 
positioning the bucket teeth) a positional controller is 
required. The commands from the activities manager 
thus instruct the bucket to move to specific X,Y,Z co- 
ordinates in space. Angle sensors were placed on the 
arm joints to provide closed-loop control. 
When moving in soil a velocity controller is required. 
The commands from the activities manager instruct the 
tip of the bucket teeth to comply with a particular 
velocity vector (i.e. speed and direction). This strategy 
accepts the fact that movement in the ground needs to be 
highly adaptive as ground conditions change, and that 
there is little likelhood of reaching a specific point via a 
predetermined path. Error feedback is used by the 
activities manager to modify the velocity command in 
order to optimise performance. Thus if the excavator 
cannot achieve the demanded velocity because the 
ground is too hard, the activities manager will direct the 
low-level controller to attempt a shallower dig where the 
ground is expected to be softer. This approach has 
proved very effective in providing pseudo-force 
feedback without the need of additional force sensors. 
The low-level arm controller is currently implemented 
in “C”. 
Of the above high-level modules, it is most difficult 
to provide an early detailed requirements specification 
for the digging manager. The digging manager is the 
module that directs the digging process and has 
knowledge of the tactics required for efficient operation. 
To help the prototyping of the digging manager a design 
platform concept was used. The design platform allows 
the developers to try out and modify ideas, as well as 
reacting swiftly to requirements changes in other system 
components. 
The aim of the design platform is to provide 
maximum flexibility without compromising on 
maintainability. Maintainability is essential not only 
because of the potentially fast and possibly radical 
prototyping process, but also because of the unstable 
nature of developing the system using students. The 
purpose is to produce a detailed and static specification 
of the activities manager module. This specification is 
then used to produce an optimised and well engineered 
software solution. 
In order to construct a design platform, it is 
necessary to have at least a basic understanding of the 
robotic system and the high level goals of the control 
software. Most useful intelligent robots will be finite 
state machines. These are systems which are in one or 
other particular state of activity depending upon the 
stimuli received. These stimuli can be as a result of 
signals from sensors, timers, switches or work 
instructions from a higher level programme. The stimuli 
trigger the switch from one state to another. Figure 4 
shows a state transition diagram for “digging within 
reach”. The words inside the boxes describe particular 
states and the words in italics outside the boxes indicate 
the stimuli that triggers the transition from one state to 
another. The digging manager is implemented using the 
well known AI technique of a production system 
[Seward 1992 ] in ADA. The semi-formalism of this 
technique assists in making the safety case for the robot. 
About seventy production rules are required for 
excavation, but because the system is a finite state 
machine only a sub-set of the rules needs to be 
considered within any particular state. 
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Figure 4 - finite state transition diagram 
3.0 System hardware 
The software architecture shown above leads naturally 
to a hardware architecture. A conventional Intel 486 
based system has been adopted - initially based around 
three processors. One for the digging and navigation 
manager, one for the low-level controllers and one for 
the safety manager. The ultra-compact PC 104 format is 
used with the processors communicating via a CAN bus. 
The following sensors are provided: 
0 Four potentiometers on the joints for angle 
measurement 
0 A tilt sensor for reasons of safety and levelling the 
trench 
0 An obstacle detection sensor (see later) 
Bump sensors 
0 A Trimble 7400MSi series satellite GPS for location 
and navigation 
These sensors are currently hard-wired, but it is the 
long-term intention to convert all sensors to “intelligent” 
sensors communicating via the CAN bus. 
3.1 Obstacle detection sensor 
There are potentially two types of sensor 
available to the project for the detection of 
surface obstacles: 
(a) Standard ‘bump’ sensors, which can be 
fitted to the extremities of the vehicle 
and are activated only when they 
actually come into contact with an 
obstacle 
(b) The Leuze RotoScan RS 3 optical 
distance sensor, which can detected 
obstacles up to a distance of 15 metres. 
LUCIE’s sensing capabilities will be based on a 
combination of these two types of sensor. 
The Leuze RotoScan RS3 works by using 
two lasers which scan through 90” thus 
providing a semi-circle of coverage. Objects 
greater than 7 cm wide are detected up to a 25 
m range. The area is swept at lOhz and the 
precise position of objects output in serial form 
to the computer 
2 degrees 1 L Sensor 
Figure 4 - The Leuze RotoScan Sensor 
There are two important limitations which impinge on 
how the sensor can be deployed: 
(I) The range in the horizontal plane is very narrow - 
- more-or-less negligible; so it is possible for 
objects lower than the sensor to be missed, as 
well as those entirely above it - overhanging 
branches, birds etc. 
(2) The sensor only detects the obstacle closest to it. 
This means that if any part of LUCIE (the boom 
for example) cuts across the sensor’s field of 
vision, temporary blind spots will be created 
beyond which any obstacles will remain 
undetected. 
These limitations mean that the single RotoScan we are 
likely to have available must be positioned carefully. It 
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will be placed on the top of the cab at the front so that it 
monitors the region in which the boom moves when the 
cab is stationary, and when the cab rotates, the 'leading 
edge' of the sensor range will monitor the space into 
which the cab is moving. See figure 5 .  
RotoScan Sensor 
I- 
0 More external sensors - to determine appropriate 
behaviour in unstructured environments 
In addition, the behaviour of these robots must be 
considered to be non-deterministic for the following 
reasons:- 
1. The end-user may need the facility to modify the 
behaviour of the robot in order to 'train' it to carry out 
new tasks. 
2. The use of heuristic rules is probably essential for 
flexible operation. 
3. They will operate in unpredictable and unstructured 
environments. 
Side View 
Figure 5 - Optimum sensor position 
This overcomes the problem of the boom triggering the 
sensor for most applications. 
4.0 The safety problem 
There is currently a great deal of interest and active 
research throughout the world in the field of large 
mobile robots. Applications range fiom firefighting, 
handling of hazardous materials, nuclear de- 
commissioning and sub-sea activity to general 
construction robots. When the time comes for such 
technologies to reach the marketplace, safety will be a 
vital issue. Indeed unless considerable research effort is 
put into addressing the safety issues, it is conceivable 
that the fbture exploitation of such robots will be 
severely handicapped. 
Robots in the above categories differ from 
conventional industrial robots in four key ways, all of 
which have very important implications for system 
safety:- 
0 Mobility 
0 Higher power to weight ratios 
0 More intelligence - to provide autonomy to tackle 
less well defined problems 
The report "Safety and Standards for Advanced Robots - 
a First Exposition" [Advanced 19921 highlights the 
following hdamenta l  dilemma facing advanced robot 
development:- 
"Certain functions of an advanced robot i.e. its ability to 
interact with a dynamically changing world, cannot 
readily be achieved other than by the use of symbolic 
sojiware representations. To mandate the use of formal 
methods is in efect to deny thisfunctionali ty.... " 
"The issue of artificial intelligence in safety critical 
applications causes concern and has been side-stepped 
in the existing standards committees, although they are 
aware of the problems. ' I  
This conflict is being addressed by means of a software 
safety manager. This is conceived as an independent 
distinct entity, whose job it is to monitor the 
environment, and give permission for all behaviour 
which could have a safety critical component. This is a 
behaviourist approach in that it is concerned with 
achieving safe behaviour, but is not concerned with the 
processes that determine functional behaviour. Clearly, 
in the interests of efficiency and reliability, the processes 
that control functional behaviour should be rigorously 
designed using the best software engineering practices to 
maximise safe behaviour. Ultimately the safety manager 
is, however, responsible, and will block all actions that 
might create a hazard. 
5.0 Developing the safety case 
The process of developing safe systems is described in 
the "Safety Lifecycle Model" [ IEC 19921, however 
European work [Redmill 19891 has produced a model 
which greatly expands the early steps that lead up to the 
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creation of a suitable safe system requirements to be a substantial document and will contain both 
specification. verbal high level descriptions of activities, as well as 
This is shown in modified form in figure 7. The starting much more detailed information such as data-flow 
point is the creation of five documents that contain the diagrams. If the robot is to handle hazardous materials, 
necessary data to carry out a safety analysis. they must be clearly defined. 
e.g. The excavator must deposit excavated material at 
5.1. Robot physical characteristics the side of the trench by slewing the arm and cab. 





5.3. Environment details Safety 
criteria Regulations A clear description of the working environment 
cohints and conditions must be provided. This will 
contain details of such things as temperature 
ranges and noise levels. It will also contain 
information about the proximity of the robot to 
humans and other objects, particularly objects 
which can provoke significant secondary hazards 
such as power cables or pressure vessels. 
e.g. The machine operates on a site which has a 
site boundary fence to prevent access by members 
of the public, but no physical barrier exists 
between itself and human workers. 






p e m  Specification 1 
Figure 7 Breakdown for requirements specification 
This contains such details as the dimensions, power and 
speed of the proposed robot. Much of this information 
will be presented in diagrammatic or tabular form. 
e.g. The excavator slewing mechanism can apply a 
torque of up to 30 W m  
5.2. Robot mission specification 
This describes the range of tasks that the robot must 
actually perform. It is essentially the robot requirements 
specification minus the safety considerations. It is likely 
This contains the information which will form 
the basis for decision making concerning safety, 
reliability and availability. 
It includes the required safety performance for 
the robot in terms of accident probabilities as well 
as listing requirements for self-test facilities and 
redundancy. 
This data can be both difficult to acquire and have 
an important influence on the economic viability 
of the robot. 
e.g. The robot must operate in such a manner that 
it will not cause a higher incidence of accidents 
than a similar manually operated machine. 
The machine must demonstrate an availability of 
at least 75% in a 24 hour working day. 
5.5. Regulations and constraints 
Existing legislation concerning mobile robots 
is rare, despite the large number of organisations 
developing legislation. There has been a distinct shift 
away from prescriptive technical structures, and a move 
towards a more open format for implementation of 
safety issues throughout the design process. In particular 
this has been reinforced by the onus placed on 
designers, manufacturers and suppliers regarding their 
responsibilities in connection with product liability. 
Procedures which relate to safety issues require clear 
identification of the possible hazards which exist within 
equipment and the associated risks which are present in 
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its use. The situation is further complicated by 
conflicting regulations from various European and 
International organisations, despite much work that has 
been carried out to harmonise areas of conflict. 
e.g. Machinery Directive 91/368/EEC[4]:- The 
obligations laid down by the essential health and safety 
requirements apply only when the corresponding hazard 
exists for the machinely in question when it is used 
under the conditionsforeseen by the manufacturer. 
Mistakes and faults from very complex wiring 
layouts are reduced but bus faults themselves 
become safety critical. Provided such faults can be 
detected the system can be shut down. 
0 The defmition of safety requirements for new 
automated products is difficult as they are often 
being developed in advance of legislation. The 
emerging solution is to prepare a well-argued safety 
case to demonstrate that the new system is at least as 
safe as a comparable conventional manual system. 
6.0 The VORD requirements tool 
Acknowledgement 
Current analysis methods such as the Ward-Mellor 
approach [Kotonya 1992, 19951 for real-time systems 
are really software design rather than systems 
requirements engineering methods. System requirements 
engineering, particularly where safety considerations are 
concerned, needs input from multiple perspectives and 
different engineering disciplines. To support this, we 
have developed a notion of viewpoints, which represent 
system stakeholders or sub-systems, and which are used 
to capture their requirements. To support this we have 
developed a tool called VORD (Viewpoint-Oriented 
Requirements Definition) has been developed which 
covers the requirements engineering process from initial 
requirements discovery through to detailed system 
modelling. The tool has been extended to incorporate an 
explicit safety analysis activity. 
The safety analysis process includes the 
identification of safety considerations, hazard 
identification, hazard analysis, risk analysis and the 
derivation, recording and checking of safety 
requirements. The hazard and risk analysis stages use 
any appropriate hazard and risk analysis techniques and 
are not tied to any particular method, however in this 
case fault-trees are used. VORD automatically computes 
statistical probabilities of hazards causing incidents. 
Conclusions 
The safety of powerful mobile robots in unstructured 
environments is a formidable problem, and some of the 
conclusions that have been reached so far are: 
0 Where possible safety related software should be 
isolated from functional software and given special 
consideration. An independent safety manager is the 
ultimate result of this philosophy. 
0 For reasons of both safety and reliability, the 
dependence on large numbers of sensors should be 
minimised. The move towards intelligent sensors 
which self-check and output high grade information 
should be encouraged. 
0 The issue of whether or not to adopt a 
communications bus such as CAN is a difficult one. 
This work is part of the Safe-SAM project which is 
jointly sponsored by the UK Department of Trade and 
Industry (DTI) and Engineering and Physical Sciences 
Research Council (EPSRC) Safety Critical Systems 
Programme. 
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